

# **A LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE ON THE NATURE AND PACE OF TRANSPORT REFORM**

Derek Scafton

Transport Systems, University of South Australia

## **Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of major changes to transport policy in Australia, with occasional reference to New Zealand and Canada (1). The review draws examples of reform from all modes of transport, some of which were successful (however defined) and others less so, at national, state-wide and regional level, and identifies factors influencing changes in transport that might have potential application to the development of policy planning in the future. Where appropriate, the role of research in contributing to reform and the effectiveness of analysts in the planning process are also discussed.

The paper is an updated version of a presentation to the Bureau of Transport Economics colloquium on transport reform, competition and the future, and complements the proceedings of the Roundtable on Reforming Canada's Transportation Policies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, held at the Van Horne Institute, University of Calgary, which included a paper by Professor Peter Forsyth on the role of the Productivity Commission in Australia (Forsyth, 2011).

## **Historical Context**

The stage was set for the changes that were to take place in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by the decision in 1954 of the Privy Council in the Hughes & Vale case, when the Council held that any 'discretionary licensing system of vehicles engaged in interstate trade and commerce was a direct restraint of that trade...' (93 CLR 1, 1954). This decision effectively deregulated interstate road transport in Australia, and was a clear signal that protecting, prohibiting or

hindering trade and commerce was unconstitutional (Dowcra and Kolsen, 1993). In the same year the Privy Council ruled in the Winner case that jurisdiction of inter-provincial road transport in Canada rests with the federal government (Chow, 1988).

Measures to ensure the fitness of operators or the technical suitability of equipment are consistent with the Constitution, can be used to impose regulations on transport, and were so used to continue to regulate some interstate transport (as well as most intrastate transport) for much of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century . However, other factors, such as new and improved highways, the development of truck and bus technology, entrepreneurial flair, and the lack of response from the railways to the changing competitive environment (despite the benefits gained from the widespread introduction of diesel traction), all combined with the Privy Council decision to pave the way for the growth of long distance road transport, particularly road freight.

In the 1960s some State governments in Australia began to realise that continued protection of their railways by regulating competitors was no longer helpful – the problems of declining or static rail revenues and rising costs required more radical solutions to be applied (Holthuyzen, 1987). In South Australia, a Royal Commission on State Transport Services, which reported in 1968, made a number of recommendations, including endorsing a program of gradual deregulation of intrastate road transport, suggesting a broad-ranging review of the state-owned railway and its services, and permitting intrastate bus services to compete with rail (Nelligan et al, 1968). The Royal Commission also pointed out that that the Federal Government had no power to regulate entry into intrastate air services, which raised the possibility of existing regional air services being opened up to competition, although it was not until the late 1970s that third-level carriers began to compete on regular route air services in South Australia (Starrs and Starkie, 1983).

A major development in the 1960s that was to influence transport policy for the rest of the century was the establishment of two federal organisations with a degree of autonomy, staffed by ‘thinking’ professionals: the Bureau of Transport Economics (BTE) (2) and the Commonwealth Bureau of Roads (CBR). The list of BTE research

reports and other publications (including contributions to Australian Road Research Board and Australasian Transport Research Forum meetings), and the CBR reports that proved too hot for politicians to handle and were partly responsible for the later merger of CBR into BTE, are testament to the rigorous research that was undertaken or sponsored by those agencies.

The most important factor in transport reform in Australia during the 1970s was the broad recognition that the railways would need more than slow and marginal changes to fit them to be an effective part of the national transport network. The (Labor) federal government's policy was an offer to buy the state-owned rail systems and create a national railway (similar to Canadian National), although Prime Minister Gough Whitlam made it clear that the Commonwealth was not interested in taking over responsibility for urban passenger railways. Politics intervened, and all that eventuated was the acquisition by the Commonwealth Government of the two smallest rail networks, those in South Australia and Tasmania, which were then merged with the trans-Australian Commonwealth Railways to form Australian National Railways (ANR, later AN). Although the aim of a truly national railway did not progress far at the time, the establishment of ANR in the mid-1970s created a platform for future rail reform (ARRDO, 1981).

In the later 1970s and early 1980s a number of inquiries were undertaken into various aspects of aviation policy, finance and operations, including the Hewitt Committee on civil aviation services and facilities, the McNeill Inquiry on governance and financial structures of the two major government-owned airlines, Trans-Australia Airlines (domestic) and Qantas Airways (international) and their relations with the federal Department of Transport, followed by the Domestic Air Transport Policy Review and the Holcroft Inquiry into domestic air fares (Poulton, 1981). These inquiries, together with the later Independent Review of Economic Regulation of Domestic Aviation (May et al, 1986), paved the way for the demise of the two-airline policy in 1990, the merger of TAA and Qantas, the sale of major airports, the collapse of Ansett Airlines and the later rise of Virgin Blue, now Virgin Australia (Elder, 1988; Crawford, 1990).

### **The Influence of National Competition Policy**

Politics continued to strongly affect the nature and pace of rail reform, especially in the formation of the National Rail Corporation in 1991, which partly reflected a reaction by the railways of New South Wales and Victoria to the perceived aggressive behaviour of Australian National, a railway not so constrained by parochial attitudes and social inertia. Despite this move to create a more business-like freight railway, road transport continued to dominate the general freight land transport business, except on the corridor linking the eastern states with Western Australia – the route that was the main reason for AN's success. The establishment of the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) in 1992, following an initiative of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) that was driven by central agencies (PM's, Premiers' and Treasury departments) rather than the transport bureaucracies, was a major breakthrough in taking a national approach to road transport regulation and charging.

But the main stimuli for transport reform in the last years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and continuing through to the present, were the release of the Hilmer Report (Hilmer et al, 1993) and the delineation of National Competition Policy in 1995, including, *inter alia*, principles of access to infrastructure across several sectors of the economy, including transport. As a result, changes to all modes of transport gathered momentum in the succeeding ten or so years. The pace has slowed somewhat in more recent times, partly because some of the reforms took time to settle into a stable form, e.g. the success or failure of niche rail operators and new airlines, the implementation of contracting/franchising of urban public transport routes and networks, and the problems that emerged from vertical separation of railway track from operations.

The following paragraphs summarise the raft of reforms that followed the application of National Competition Policy and/or built on the platform of changes that had taken place during the previous thirty years.

The changes in aviation were extensive, commencing with the privatisation of Qantas in 1995, and privatisation (through long leases) of the major federal government-owned airports commencing

in 1997. The Commonwealth Government had divested itself of involvement in smaller regional airports in the preceding decades (Street and Smith, 1996), through a process similar to that adopted by the Canadian federal government in the early 1970s when it withdrew subsidies from intra-provincial ferry services after successful negotiations with provincial governments such as Ontario and Quebec. Financial aspects of the privatisation of major airports were accompanied by varying levels of regulatory oversight, but these were all removed by 2002. Also affecting aviation was a relaxation of foreign ownership rules in 1999, though the extent of foreign ownership is still an issue, associated with the gradual liberalisation of bilateral arrangements (OECD, 1997). Perhaps the greatest indicator that the days of the two-airline policy and direct government operation of airports were over was the passive response by government to the collapse of Ansett Airlines in 2001, the privately-owned airline that had operated in parallel with TAA/Qantas for so many years.

The need for reform of Australia's maritime industries was obvious: 'ANL was grossly under-capitalised, ships were overmanned, waterfront productivity was poor, the strike record both aboard ship and on the waterfront was abysmal, and both the sea transport and shore-based shipping industries were rife with unacceptable work practices' (Lewarn, 1989, pp 84/85). The Australian National Line was sold, stevedoring was reformed (Sayers, 1988), South Australian ports were privatised as a package, some Victorian regional ports were privatised, and ports in NSW subjected to changes including pricing (Beevor and Hayes, 1989). More flexible arrangements for use of foreign ships in domestic trades were gradually introduced, but were rolled back to some extent as recently as 2012 (Berg and Lane, 2013).

The work of the National Road Transport Commission in the 1990s was impressive in gradually creating across-Australia standards for regulation of heavy road transport vehicles and operations, including nationally consistent charges, performance based standards, and harmonisation of technical standards including size and weight, noise, road safety, hours of work, etc. (Moore and Starrs, 1993). State and territory governments continue to be responsible for construction and

maintenance of highways, though the federal government funds expenditures on the designated National Highway network through the state road authorities. Private involvement in major road infrastructure is found in the three eastern states (NSW, Queensland and Victoria), with varying levels of success, including financial failures mainly due to overestimating patronage (and therefore revenue) during the early years of operation of toll roads.

Privatisation of former government-owned freight railways was widespread in Australia after 1995 (3), mainly through sale of above-track operations, but in some cases of vertically integrated networks. In 1997 the former Australian National was divided into four entities: regional freight operations centred in South Australia, interstate passenger services, the Tasmanian system, and the mainland track. The first three were sold, Tasmania as an integrated freight network, with the mainland freight and passenger services operating over track vested in a new federal authority, the Australian Rail Track Corporation, which as well as owning the former ANR trackage, was given powers under an intergovernmental agreement to lease main line tracks in other states (BTRE, 2006). Sale of the Victorian and West Australian railways followed in 1999 and 2000 respectively, both with track leases from the state government authorities, but the most important privatisations were those of the freight operations in NSW and the National Rail Corporation, sold simultaneously to Pacific National, then a joint venture of the Toll and Patrick companies, now owned by Asciano . Privatisation of Australia's mainland freight rail system was completed with the sale of Queensland Rail's freight services in 2010. Whilst performance has generally improved under the new regime and most of the privatised operations been relatively successful (Scrafton, 2011), smaller operators, taking advantage of mandated rights for third party access to track, have struggled to establish niche markets. The return of operations and track to the state government in Tasmania is in sharp contrast to progress on the mainland (see Laird, 2013, for details of the Tasmanian story, and a similar return of the railways to the public sector in New Zealand).

Most regional passenger rail services remain government-owned and operated, although V-Line (Victoria) was franchised unsuccessfully

and soon reverted to government. There are some private operations, notably the Great Southern Railways (former AN) long-distance trains from Sydney to Perth (Indian-Pacific), Adelaide to Darwin (Ghan) and Adelaide to Melbourne (Overland), which run once or twice weekly, actual frequency being subject to seasonal fluctuations. Private funding of the airport rail services and associated infrastructure in Brisbane and Sydney has not been a financial success. Other developments of note concerning railways include the incorporation of rail technical matters in the mandate of the former NRTC, which became the National Transport Commission (NTC) in 2004, and proposals for improvements to the rail network between Melbourne and Brisbane, with or without high speed trains between Sydney and Melbourne.

Changes in urban public transport have been less dramatic than those affecting long-distance transport as the high capital costs and operating subsidies required inhibit innovation and are politically sensitive (Hughes, 1993). Private bus services have operated in most Australian cities for many years, and since the mid-1990s changes have been made to former government-owned metropolitan operations, including franchising of rail, tram and bus services in Melbourne, contracting out of bus services in Adelaide and Perth, and sale of the Sydney harbour ferries. Regulation of taxicabs continues in almost all cities and towns, partly to protect plate values, but the growth of a competitor in the upmarket hire car industry has lessened calls for deregulation of taxis. Suburban rail passenger services in all the major state capital cities remain government-owned and operated, except in Melbourne where they are franchised to a private consortium.

A person involved or interested in only one mode of transport during their career, and who had participated in the detailed work of reform in that sector for many years (such as an economist in NRTC/NTC on heavy vehicle charging, or a civil servant involved in the Victorian franchising program) might have the view that reform of transport is a slow and uncertain process. In the early 1990s Australians looked eastwards to the changes being made to transport in New Zealand (Toleman, 1990), and suspected that the federal system of government would hinder or even prevent implementation of similar

changes in Australia, but the longer-term view across all modes shows considerable progress. Private funding, ownership and/or management has expanded in transport infrastructure and services, there have been major changes in employment practices and operational standards, in regulatory and technical harmonisation, and in pricing (Scrafton, 2005).

Not everyone would agree that the outcomes from these changes are positive ones; some would challenge the view that one or more of them represents progress. With reforms of this magnitude there are bound to be some losers. The hypothetical question that must be addressed is: what would the situation be now if change had not occurred? As an example, the former integrated State Transport Authority of South Australia was an excellent concept, but one that was effectively destroyed from within as management and labour (with the collusion of government) captured the benefits, at the expense of the users. The contracting out reforms of the early 1990s corrected that problem (including separating funding from operations) and improved the quality of service on the ground, only to be replaced by other problems, such as a Minister's unwillingness to let a Board exercise autonomy, to the extent that its functions were absorbed back into a departmental organisation.

### **Lessons learned**

First and most important, deregulation may have been unpopular and divisive, but it was an essential step if significant change to transport was to occur. The 'heavy hand of bureaucracy', central planning and control, 'government knows best' - however characterised, the practices of economic regulation that had been gradually introduced up to the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the restrictions that were imposed on transport operations had to be loosened, even eliminated, if greater efficiency was to be achieved, competition encouraged and social welfare enhanced (Dowcra and Kolsen, 1982; Forsyth, 1992). In most cases the market, however imperfect, will delineate the conditions in which transport can compete to provide the service justified by the level of traffic offering, as evidenced by the difficulty that successive potential third trunk airlines (such as Compass, East-West and Tiger) have had in entering the intercity aviation market, and by competition for the intrastate air markets (Duldig and Findlay,



1990). Similarly, intercity coach operators have had to continually change their organisational structures and services to match the traffic in what are long, thinly populated corridors; and in the rural and regional road freight market there is rarely room for more than one general freight haulage company serving a small town. Open access, mandated under National Competition Policy, has also proved important in creating opportunities for existing carriers and new entrants to seek out markets, however limited or specialised, as evidenced by the number of small rail operators and SCT who have succeeded in providing competition for rail (or providing complementary services such as yard switching), and particularly by the expansion of Aurizon, the privatised former Queensland Rail.

Second, it is clear that the need for reform has to be recognised and the priorities for action have to be set at the very top of organisations. Key reforms such as responding to the Hilmer report and the establishment of NRTC, came from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), not from transport agencies. Similarly, many of the reforms in aviation came as a result of independent inquiries, inter-departmental or inter-governmental reviews. The momentum of reform needs to be maintained, too, assisted and advocated by organisations that are arms-length from government, such as state pricing tribunals, the Productivity Commission, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.

Third, good ideas take time to be bedded in; patience and determination are required to overcome resistance and inertia in the system (Potterton, 2012). In the mid-1960s a review of uneconomic rail branch lines in the Canadian prairie provinces for a federal parliamentary committee identified over three dozen routes that might be abandoned without undue adverse consequences, but it took twenty years before most of those lines had been removed from the prairie rail network, mainly due to opposition from grain interests (Parsons, 1998; Nash and Clegg, 2003). Similar long time lines were also needed for Canadian National to be transformed from a government railway requiring financial support and recapitalisation to being one of the most profitable private railways in North America (Boardman et al, 2013).

Which leads to the fourth lesson – that corporatisation is a positive step to progressing change in the public sector, but it usually only a step (Forsyth, 1993). Politicians and bureaucrats have difficulty reconciling their responsibilities with the need to let public corporations or public companies operate along business lines. Privatisation of potentially successful organisations is almost inevitable, but the time frame to sale can be short or long depending on the nature and business of the organisation. There are exceptions to this assertion, but in almost all those cases there are other factors that keep the organisation in the public sector, such as the ideology of the government in power, and the relative pressures that can be brought to bear by third parties, such as potential buyers and labor unions.

Franchising and contracting out is an option where continued government financial support is required, but experience in Australia has been only partly successful (Wallis and Bray, 2013). One problem has been inadequate initial planning, wherein one factor has been allowed to dominate the contracting process, e.g. seeking to maximise sale price, or favouring local bidders. Another is the tendency to impose strict controls on the franchisee (perhaps due to financial constraints), which in turn limits the opportunity for new ideas or services to be introduced during the life of the franchise. This latter problem can lead to government agencies micro-managing transport, despite the introduction of private owners and operators.

Finally, it is clear that all the reform processes need strong professional support and independent advice. The activities of committees of inquiry, the existence of the Productivity Commission and its predecessors, the work of independent task forces and national bodies such as NRTC/NTC, have been crucial in recommending reforms, carrying them through, monitoring progress, and refining arrangements when desirable to do so. In all these organisations there are back-room teams of researchers, analysts and professionals supporting the Commissioners and other principals, plus the ability to call on outside bodies and individuals for research and advice. There is no substitute for good data, rigorous analysis and clear, well thought through, conclusions and recommendations.

### **What next?**

There is still work to be done on current reform programs in Australia, particularly in passenger transport. Some regional passenger trains are still protected from bus services, when automobile travel is a much more significant competitor, and some states still control entry to intrastate air services, particularly where subsidies are involved. Taxis are tightly regulated, partly due to the difficulty of devising an equitable mechanism to compensate existing licensees .

There is scope for more competition in urban public transport, building on progress to date. In Adelaide there is the anomaly of the bus network (which carries more than 80% of public transport trips) being contracted out, while the more expensive suburban rail and tram system continues to be owned, operated and subsidised by the State Government. The protracted experience of franchising the tram and rail networks in Melbourne demonstrates there is still potential for improving the processes involved in contracting for private provision of urban transport services. In addition, too many recent reforms have been implemented with much basic information kept secret, even though considerable sums of public funds are involved. 'Commercial-in confidence' is invoked to avoid transparency, whether justified or not, e.g. on the subsidy split between the tendered contracts for bus services and the negotiated budget for the tram and rail services in Adelaide. More broadly, a lack of data limits the capability of interested outside parties to analyse the contractual arrangements and evaluate the economic and public sector financial issues involved.

Some of the outstanding matters that might be included in a reform agenda for transport in the near future include: tackling the residual issues such as taxis, country buses, international aviation, and coastal shipping; linking investment more closely to needs and performance (nothing in recent years has matched the rigour of analysis undertaken by CBR and BTE); and at the same time improving the decision-making process for investment in transport to remove opportunities for intervention by parochial politics. A resurgence of Treasuries willing to challenge transport proposals that lack credibility could assist (Maclean and Hickman, 1976), though finance

departments have not shown much inclination to intervene in recent years.

Structural reform can originate with and be driven from within by management, but change usually requires some stimuli, such as correcting internal weaknesses to improve performance, pressure from shareholders or a competitor, a need or wish to sell assets, or reduced external regulation. The private sector is usually more flexible and responsive to the need for change, compared to governments that are slower to agree to changes. Some reforms can only be implemented by cooperative action, such as integrated fare or invoicing systems, and network-wide traffic signal optimisation. Other areas require strong policy direction and planning coordination, particularly in urban areas where so many functions interact within the transport system, e.g. public transport, congestion management, airport access.

Where governments seek to introduce more efficient commercial practices into an organisation, they have often chosen to set up authorities or boards to oversee the process. While this can be achieved through a commission structure, true corporatisation requires a company to be established that is subject to corporate law, with the Board given a measure of independence free from political interference, or at least with a clear division of powers, whereby a government may direct a Board, but must do so in writing, with the direction reported in the organisation's Annual Report, and additional funding provided if necessary to implement the direction.

Whether a mode of transport is public or privately owned, it is important to have in place clear policies and strategic plans, minimal regulatory or other constraints, and an understanding of the most efficient mechanisms to deliver reform. The existence and activities of independent research and advisory organisations can be useful in identifying directions and sectors for reform, and also help in evaluating requests for investment funds.

### Endnotes

- (1) The paper is a personal retrospective based on fifty years working in transport, first as a researcher in UK and in the Transportation Policy and Research Branch of the federal Department/Ministry of Transport in Ottawa. Experience of the processes and impacts of policy reform was gained as Director General of Transport in South Australia, with concurrent service on many boards, authorities and inquiries in Australia, including the Australian National Railways Commission, National Transport Planning Taskforce, Industry Commission, Economic Planning Advisory Commission, and Productivity Commission.
- (2) The Bureau of Transport Economics has undergone several changes of name over the years, depending on additions to the federal Minister of Transport's portfolio, e.g. regional development, communications, infrastructure. In this paper it is usually abbreviated as BTE, though references are listed under the full title of the Bureau current at the time of publication.
- (3) In addition to the seven former government-owned railways in Australia, many private railways have been constructed, mainly linking mines to the coast, the largest being the iron ore railways of the Pilbara region of Western Australia.

### References

*Note: Papers of the Australasian Transport Research Forum (Australian TRF from 1975-1987) are abbreviated to ATRF, and Proceedings of the Canadian Transportation Research Forum to CTRF. ATRF papers are available via the website: [www.atrf.info](http://www.atrf.info)*

- Australian Railway Research and Development Organisation (ARRDO): Report on Rail. Melbourne, 1981
- Beevor S and Hayes J: Port Management Reforms in New South Wales. ATRF vol 14 pp 369-389, Perth, 1989
- Berg C and Lane A: Coastal Shipping Reform: Industry Saviour or Regulatory Nightmare. Institute of Public Affairs, Melbourne, 2013
- Boardman AE, Laurin C, Moore MA, and Vining AR: Efficiency, profitability and welfare gains from the Canadian National Railways privatization. Research in Transportation Business & Management, vol 6, pp 19-30, 2013
- Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE): Optimising harmonisation in the Australian railway industry. Report 114, Canberra, 2006
- Chow G: Reform of Trucking Regulation in Canada. ATRF vol 13 pp 79-100, Christchurch, 1988
- Commonwealth Law Reports: Hughes & Vale v NSW Government. CLR 1, 1954
- Crawford D: The changing state of Australia's domestic aviation industry. ATRF vol 15 pp 163-181, Sydney, 1990
- Dowcra GE and Kolsen HM: Deregulation or Regulation Reform. ATRF vol 7 pp 1-19, Hobart, 1982

Dowcra GE and Kolsen HM: Constitutional Powers, the High Court and Australian Transport. ATRF vol 18 pp 399-409, Brisbane, 1993

Duldig P and Findlay C: Deregulation in a low density market: the case of South Australian air transport. ATRF vol 15 pp 199-208, Sydney, 1990

Elder R: Economic Deregulation of Aviation. ATRF vol 13 pp 435-462, Christchurch 1988

Forsyth P: Transport deregulation in Australia: an interpretation in terms of public interest and private interest theories. ATRF vol 17 pp 21-38, Canberra, 1992

Forsyth P: Corporatisation, Privatisation and the Regulation of Australia's Airports. ATRF vol 18 pp 183-201, Brisbane, 1993

Forsyth P: The Role of the Productivity Commission in Designing a Dynamic Transportation Policy for Australia. Proceedings of the Roundtable on Reforming Canada's Transportation Policies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, The Van Horne Institute, University of Calgary, 2011

Hilmer F, Rayner M and Taperell G: National Competition Policy. Report by the Independent Committee of Inquiry. AGPS, Canberra, 1993

Holthuyzen F: The Finances and Performance of Australia's Rail Systems. ATRF vol 12 pp 17-42, Brisbane, 1987

Hughes D: The Political Economy of Urban Transport Reform. ATRF vol 18 pp 411-423, Brisbane, 1993

Laird PG: Government rail asset sales and return to the public sector in New Zealand and Tasmania. Research in Transportation Business & Management, vol 6 pp 116-122, 2013

Lewarn B: A Decade of Change for Australian Sea Transport and Shore-based Shipping Industries. ATRF vol 14 pp 83-105, Perth, 1989

Maclean JD and Hickman JM: A more critical look at some of the assumptions used in allocating Commonwealth Government assistance for Land Transport investment. ATRF vol 2 pp 577-606, Adelaide, 1976

May TE, Mills G and Butcher EWA: Independent Review of Economic Regulation of Domestic Aviation. AGPS, Canberra, 1986

Moore B and Starrs MM: Road Transport Reform in a Federal System. ATRF vol 18 pp 425-442, Brisbane, 1993

Nash J and Clegg P: CPR Branch Line Discontinuance – Historical Perspective and Current Realities. 38<sup>th</sup> CTRF pp 153-167, Ottawa, 2003

Nelligan JW, Shanahan T and Jeffrey GHP: Report of the Royal Commission on Transport Services. Government Printer, Adelaide, 1968

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: The Future of International Air Transport Policy. OECD, Paris, 1997

Parsons G: Regulation, Logistics and Efficiency; Introducing Competition and Market Pricing to Western Canada's Grain Handling and Transportation System. 33<sup>rd</sup> CTRF pp 1-22, Edmonton, 1998

- Potterton P: 30 Years of Australian Transport Policy: What makes for Success? ATRF vol 35, Perth, 2012
- Poulton HW: Law, History and Politics of the Australian Two Airline System. Parkville, Melbourne, 1981
- Sayers C: Regulation and Privatisation in the Australian Waterfront Industry. ATRF vol 18 pp 591-614, Christchurch, 1988
- Scrafton D: Transport Policy in New Zealand and Australia. In Button KJ and Hensher DA: Handbook of Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions, pp 803-819. Elsevier, Oxford, 2005
- Scrafton D: Progress in Railway Reform in Australia and New Zealand. Journal of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, Dublin, 2011
- Starrs M and Starkie D: Unregulated Airline Markets – the South Australian Experience. ATRF vol 8 pp 11-29, Canberra, 1983
- Street J and Smith D: Airport Privatisation in Canada and Australia: Experiments in Structures and of Ownership and Control. 31<sup>st</sup> CTRF pp 396-406, Winnipeg, 1996
- Toleman RF: Structural reform of New Zealand's transport system. ATRF vol 15 pp 21-37, Sydney, 1990
- Wallis IP and Bray DJ: The contracting of urban bus services – recent Australian developments. Papers of the 13<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, Oxford, 2013